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The first two reports for the Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme (BFDPP) have raised questions about the
effectiveness of current policies for the control of illegal drugs, both national and international. We now move on to
examine the reasoning and evidence base that is used to support different policies, initiatives and activities. 
The next three BFDPP reports will articulate the thinking behind a particular approach to reducing drug-related harm,
as well as looking at the objectives set within each drug policy approach, the means by which these objectives have been
pursued, and the extent to which these objectives have been achieved (if at all). It makes sense to begin this investigation by
looking at the approach to drug policy that has dominated the field for much of the past 40 years, and is sometimes
characterised – and, to some degree, caricatured – as the ‘war on drugs’approach. 
INTRODUCTION
For the ‘war of drugs’ paradigm, the fundamental objective of
drug policy is to reduce the scope and scale of drug markets (it
targets ‘prevalence’), and the preferred means is through supply-
side initiatives, particularly tough and uncompromising law
enforcement (often combined with the promotion of a strong
‘anti-drug’ social consensus, education and prevention with a
strong ‘just say no’ message and other interventions that are
modelled on a law enforcement approach – such as extensive
drug testing in schools and the work place). In addition, the
champions of this approach to drug policy are often – although
not universally – suspicious of harm reduction measures that to
some extent accept continued drug use (such as information on
avoiding drug related harms, needle exchange schemes, or
supervised consumption facilities). They tend to view these
initiatives as signalling an admission of defeat on prevalence
reduction, and a form of accommodation to a drug culture.
A word of caution, however: this policy paradigm should be
viewed as an idealised type that has been implemented – to a
greater or lesser extent – by different national and international
strategies. There is a tendency for the discussion and analysis of
drug policy to divide a range of approaches into two
diametrically opposed camps – pitching ‘supply reduction’
against ‘harm minimisation’. This division is not unhelpful for
illuminating broad trends and trajectories, but it presents an
over-simplified and excessively polarised view of the complex
and interconnected range of policy options. 
In reality, policy makers and opinion formers who champion
supply reduction believe this is the best way of reducing the
harms drugs cause to users, families, communities and society
as a whole. There is a clear and common sense attraction to this
argument: if there is less heroin produced and distributed, there
are likely to be less heroin users, there are therefore likely to be
less heroin addicts, and this will result in a reduction in the
associated health, social and crime problems. Conversely, harm
minimisers recognise that reducing prevalence is one effective
way of reducing drug-related harm, but point out that the
relationship between prevalence and harm is not
straightforward (for example, the relationship between the
number of heroin addicts and the incidence of health problems
will depend on a range of mediating factors, such as the extent
of safe injecting practices). Questions about the current
approach are also raised by those who are sceptical about the
scope for, and effectiveness of, supply reduction. 
Furthermore, those drug strategies that are held up as
epitomising a law enforcement driven approach – such as the
UN Drug Strategy and the current US strategy – do recognise
the need for some harm reduction initiatives as well. It is all a
matter of degree. What characterizes a ‘war on drugs’ approach
most clearly is the dominance of ‘zero tolerance’ messages, and
high investment in law enforcement – compared with
education, prevention, treatment and harm reduction. For
example, the 2003 US Federal drug control budget allocated
$6.2 billion to law enforcement and interdiction from a total of
$11.2 billion, and the UK 2002 Updated Drug Strategy
estimates that over 60 per cent of Government anti-drug
expenditure is targeted at law enforcement (see
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov and Home Office 2002).
These figures do not include the massive costs of arresting,
processing and incarcerating people who commit offences
under the drug laws. All governments have to work with
limited resources. The opportunity costs of concentrating the
lion’s share of available resources on supply reduction is that less
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money is available for education and prevention, public health
measures and treatment of drug addiction. 
So, is this money well spent? A lot depends on the criteria for
success. For the war on drugs approach, objectives are focused
on an overall reduction in the scale of drug supply or use.
Typically, those national and international bodies that have
embraced these kinds of drug policies have adopted prevalence
reduction targets. Notoriously, the current UN strategy
promises a ‘drug free world’ by 2008. Perhaps we shouldn’t take
this slogan too seriously as a genuine statement of intent.
Nonetheless the aim is clearly to substantially reduce – if not
actually to eliminate – the use and availability of illicit
psychoactive drugs. Similarly, the current US drug strategy has
set five-year goals of a 25% reduction in current drug use
among both young people and adults. Most national and
international strategies have some form of headline
commitment to similar reductions (White House 2004, p. 3). 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY
REDUCTION: THE EVIDENCE
Reducing the scale of the illicit drugs market through
government action has proven extremely difficult. We have
observed in previous reports that, during the last 40 years of
international commitment to this objective, the global market
has expanded exponentially. There are, however, examples of
specific interventions that have – in the short term and within
constricted geographical areas – led to the reduction in the
cultivation of a particular crop, the scale of trafficking along a
particular route or an increase in the price of a particular drug
or drugs. There are also some examples where the overall scope
of drug markets seems to have been contained and where this
has been attributed to strong law enforcement initiatives. But it
is hard to find solid evidence for a straightforward link between
supply reduction initiatives and sustained falls in the
consumption or availability of illegal drugs. In addition, even
where there is evidence of a fall in the use or availability of
drugs, this will not necessarily be correlated to a reduction in
drug-related harm. Finally, in some instances, prevalence
reduction appears to have been achieved only through recourse
to Draconian policies that violate basic human rights (for
example, Thailand and Communist China).
While we have found it difficult to identify documented
examples of successful supply-led policies, it may be that there
have been achievements that have not been fully recorded –
according to the 2004 World Drug Report from the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), over a quarter (26 per cent)
of the 95 countries reporting on their progress in 2002 claimed
that there had been a decrease in drug abuse in the previous
year (9 per cent reporting a ‘large decrease’) (UNODC 2004, p.
9). The UNODC report does not say which countries reported
a fall in drug abuse, nor provide details of the evidence on
which these claims were based. By the dominant criteria of
prevalence reduction, these should be interesting examples
worthy of further study, but the identity of the 25 countries
who claimed that drug abuse had fallen remains unpublished,
so we have not been able to analyse these examples. 
It should be added, in addition, that failure to reduce
prevalence does not mean that supply reduction initiatives
(and, specifically, law enforcement) are having no impact on
drug markets. It is widely – and reasonably – argued that
supply reduction contains the expansion of drug markets, even
if it fails to reduce markets. There are also specific jurisdictions
where it is claimed that a long period of comparatively low
prevalence is due to uncompromising supply side policies
(notably Sweden).
The UNODC 2004 World Drug Report itself concludes that
‘though there has been an epidemic of drug abuse over the last
half century, its diffusion into the general population has been
contained. Less that 3 per cent of the global population (or 5 per
cent of the population aged 15 and above) – the annual
prevalence rate of drug use today – is certainly evidence of
containment, particularly when compared with the annual
prevalence rate of 30 per cent for tobacco’ (UNODC 2004, p.
7). The same point is made in the US National Drug Strategy
Report 2004, which notes that ‘there are 120 million regular
drinkers in the United States and some 61 million smokers. The
comparable figure for illegal drugs is about 20 million a large
number to be sure, but far smaller than would be the case if drugs
were legal’ (White House 2004, p. 5). The broad thrust of this
claim is shared by one of the most incisive critical analyses of
drug policy to have appeared in recent years, Robert MacCoun
and Peter Reuter’s Drug War Heresies. Reuter and MacCoun
conclude that ‘if cocaine or heroin were to become available to
adults generally [i.e. if the relevant drug laws were relaxed], use
and addiction would substantially increase’ (2001, p 10).
Whether current levels of enforcement can be held solely
responsible for this degree of containment is open to question.
The evidence from Sweden examined in more detail later
suggests that strong contributory factors to a comparatively low
level of drug misuse are a public anti-drug consensus, particuarly
amongst the young, and those with high income levels.
The precise extent to which prevalence of drug use would
increase if the current enforcement controls were removed is, of
course, a subject of fierce debate and cannot be accurately
predicted empirically, but it is overwhelmingly likely that the
result of all the efforts of the authorities during the past 40
years of drug control has – to a greater or lesser extent –
contained the level of increase in prevalence. 
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Wherever there is a fall in the cultivation, trafficking,
availability or use of drugs, politicians are quick to claim that
this is due to the success of their own policies and proof that
the huge sum of money invested in supply reduction is well
spent. This is good politics, but poor analysis: invariably the
real picture is more complicated. Below, we attempt to analyse
the case for supply and enforcement led approaches at 3 levels –
production, interdiction and domestic controls – and draw out
some policy relevant conclusions.
1. PRODUCTION
Put simply, the argument for a focus on production is that, if
the production can be halted, the market is not supplied, so
consumers cannot purchase and use the substance. Control of
production of cannabis has never been a realistic possibility, as
it is grown in many diverse parts of the world and, particularly
over the last 10 years, a high proportion of consumer markets
are supplied from small-scale producers operating near to the
consumer markets. In contrast, the cultivation of both heroin
and cocaine has become more concentrated into small
geographical areas – in the case of cocaine, the Andean
countries of South America, and of heroin in Afghanistan and
the ‘golden triangle’ of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. Massive
political, diplomatic, financial – and, at times, military and
scientific – resources have been expended on the task of
reducing the production of heroin and cocaine in these areas.
In the case of Andean cocaine production, the respective
importance of Bolivia, Peru and Colombia has fluctuated over
the years – as production is reduced in one country, then it
increases in another. Over the last 5 years, successful reductions
of cultivation in Bolivia and Peru have led to an increase in
Colombia, resulting in the focusing of eradication efforts in
that country through the US-led ‘Plan Colombia’. Despite
billions of dollars of investment in recent years, the fact remains
that Colombian coca production remains of a sufficient scale to
supply the markets on both sides of the Atlantic. Patterns of
cultivation have changed in response to enforcement efforts,
but consumer demand has consistently been met, and there has
been little overall impact on price, purity and availability. 
A similar story can be told about the world’s largest producer of
opium. The UNODC 2004 World Drug Report states that
Afghanistan has produced three quarters of the world’s illicit
opium in recent years (UNODC 2004, p. 43). But in 2001 the
Taliban promulgated a decree, which effectively ended opium
cultivation in the area of Afghanistan under their control
(about 80 per cent of the country). Following the invasion of
Afghanistan and the removal of the Taliban, Afghan farmers are
now producing bumper opium crops again. An abrupt
reduction in the production of drugs may be achievable, then,
where armed soldiers ruthlessly enforce decrees that drive
farmers into poverty. Normal service may be resumed after a
Draconian regime is removed. Once again, throughout this
period, while there were significant upheavals in the pattern
and scale of production, and spectacular fluctuations in price
and availability of raw opium within Afghanistan, the impact
on consumer markets was barely noticeable (International
Crisis Group 2001; Burke J 2001; Markus U 2001; Costa A
2002; UNODC 2004; www.fco.gov.uk; Burke J, 2004).
The socio-economic costs of reductions in traditional patterns
of cultivation also need to be considered. For example, both
Myanmar and Laos have experienced large reductions in opium
production as a result of successful elimination programmes. (It
has been estimated that there has been a cumulative reduction
of 60 per cent in the area under cultivation in these two
countries since 1996.) 
But this process has not been cost free. 
The 2004 World Drug Report comments that ‘the rapid pace of
elimination is … putting tremendous economic pressure on
farmers, often from ethnic minorities, who have relied for so
long on opium production as a means of survival. There is
evidence in the eastern Shan states of Myanmar, that some of
those populations are now facing a serious humanitarian crisis’.
It continues: ‘Myanmar and Laos ranked 131st and 135th,
respectively, out of 175 countries, on the 2003 Human
Development Index; and the ethnic minorities who live in the
remote opium producing areas have a standard of living that is
even below that of the general population’ (UNODC 2004, 
p. 43). 
Broader social and humanitarian issues need to be considered in
formulating and implementing supply-reduction initiatives. A
reduction in opium production can result in unanticipated
harms in producer countries unless it is accompanied by robust
programmes of economic assistance and crop substitution.
Western governments are now starting to make significant
investments in alternative development programmes in
Afghanistan, with the UK Government recently stating that £70
million has been made available over three years for initiatives
linked to the Afghan drug control strategy (Home Office 2004,
p. 8). This is good for producer countries, but it also makes
good sense for donors if it contributes to the development of
economic activity that is not reliant on the drug trade.
2. INTERDICTION
The battle to stifle the distribution of controlled drugs on their
journey from source country to consumer countries is known
as interdiction. As most heroin and cocaine is produced outside
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of the countries where it is consumed, the next logical question
for the supply reductionist is: can we stop these substances
from being imported into our country? We have searched for
examples in recent history where the authorities have been able
to limit the import of heroin or cocaine into a particular
country, to the extent that the availability and use of the
substance in that country has been significantly affected, and
could only find one. There was a documented and significant
shortage of heroin in parts of Australia between late 2000 and
early 2002. 
This so-called ‘heroin drought’ has been the subject of heated
debate as to its causes and impacts (see Bush W, Roberts M and
Trace M 2004 & National Drug Law Enforcement Research
Fund 2004). In the summer of 2000, the Australian law
enforcement authorities seized 606kg of heroin and dismantled a
major drug trafficking syndicate. By the end of 2000, heroin-
related deaths had plummetted, the numbers of people arrested
for heroin offences was in decline, and heroin was more
expensive, harder to obtain and of poorer quality. In 1999 there
had been 1,116 deaths attributed to opioid overdoses in Australia
- by 2001 this had fallen to 386 (Bush W, Roberts M and Trace
M, p. 4). Predictably, the Liberal-National Party Government
claimed that the heroin drought showed the success of its ‘tough
on drugs’ strategy. A trend of steadily rising heroin use, which
had been evident in Australia for years, appeared to have been
reversed by one successful policing operation. 
However, a seizure of 440kg of heroin only two years earlier in
1998 ‘hadn’t made much of a dent on the market’, according to
the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (ibid, p. 2).
Why had there been a heroin drought following a big seizure in
2000, but no drought following a similar seizure in 1998? 
There are a number of possible explanations. The sudden
availability of methamphetamine was of particular significance,
as this drug originated from the same source as the Australian
opium supply – crime syndicates based in the so-called ‘golden
triangle’, particularly Myanmar. Reports of the dramatic
increase in amphetamine production coincided with dramatic
changes in the heroin trade. As early as 1996, the Australian
Office of Strategic Crime Assessments (AOSCA) had forecast a
fall in heroin imports, with the growing demand in the Chinese
market attracting shipments previously destined for Australia.
This long-standing trend was exacerbated by sharp falls in the
poppy harvest in Myanmar. Faced by a sharp fall in production
of heroin, the trafficking organisations directed their reduced
heroin stocks to China. According to the Australian Institute of
Criminology: ‘those individuals will be more concerned with
immediate needs to reduce the risks of trafficking and receive
optimal returns on their investment. In “lean” years, other
markets closer to source, and with lower trafficking costs (for
example, the Asian markets) may simply offer a better
proposition’ (Morrison S 2003, p. 6). 
This does not mean that the seizure of 606kg had no impact.
But it does mean that the Australian drought was not so much
an unambiguous triumph of supply side control, as the effect of
a combination of factors that will influence the marketing
decisions of traffickers, including weather conditions and
falling harvest yields. The efficiency of Australian law
enforcement, as demonstrated by this particular seizure, did
play a role in influencing the behaviour of the drug traffickers.
It also prevented a sizeable shipment of a harmful drug
reaching the Australian market. But the evidence suggests it was
an important secondary factor, not the determining factor. 
SUSTAINABILITY
A common theme emerges here: even on the rare occasions
where enforcement efforts at the production or interdiction
level are successful, the consequent impacts on availability and
prevalence are difficult to sustain. An authorative report on the
heroin drought by the Australian National Drug Law
Enforcement Research Fund, concludes that the heroin market
has stabilised since the end of the drought, although it has not
yet returned to pre-2001 levels (NDLERF 2004). 
There is a simple economic reason why a reduction in the
supply of a particular drug is likely to be comparatively short-
lived if there is no effective action to tackle the demand side of
the market. In an article on Thailand (see below), Pasuk
Phongpaichit of Bangkok University sets out a sound general
principle: ‘it seems to me as an economist that, if you attack the
supply but do little about demand, then the result is rising
prices, rising profitability, and hence increased
entreprenuership. I suspect that is why such suppression-
oriented approaches have persistently failed in other countries’
(Phongpaichit P 2003). 
For example, in Australia in 2001 the price of a gram of street
heroin rose from AU$220 to $320 in New South Wales, from
AU$330 to $450 in Victoria and from AU$310 to $350 in
South Australia, before falling again as supplies began to
increase (NDLERF, p. 43). By 2003, heroin prices across
Australia had stabilised, and intravenous drug users were
reporting that heroin was “easy” or “very easy” to obtain. The
Australian heroin ‘drought’ had lasted less than two years. This
underlines the importance of balancing supply reduction with
initiatives to tackle demand. A sudden drop in supply drives up
prices and this attracts new entrants to drug markets.
Demand for the most problematic drugs will tend to be least
responsive to price changes. The heroin market is largely
sustained by a cohort of regular, problem users. It is therefore
fairly inelastic. The evidence suggests that, unless heroin
addicts are successfully treated, they will either find new ways
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(or intensify old ways) of raising the money to buy heroin at
higher prices (including crime) or switch to other substances
and modes of administration.
In these examples of successful control of production or
interdiction, the results in terms of consumption have been
short-lived, as new sources and chains of supply are established
to take advantage of the increased profits to be made.
3. DOMESTIC CAMPAIGNS
If the authorities cannot sustain a reduction in overall
production of heroin or cocaine, and they cannot stop these
substances being distributed around the world, then what can
be done domestically to reduce availability and prevalence? As
we have observed before, governments around the world have
approached domestic drug control with widely varying levels of
enthusiasm. In recent history, the most concentrated efforts at
domestic drug control have been based on a mixture of social
disapproval, and deterrence backed up by strong punishments.
We have looked for examples where there is evidence that
prevalence has been reduced in a particular country, and tried
to ascertain if these reductions are linked to government
actions, or are due to changes in fashion or other socio-
economic factors. Once again, examples of significant and
recorded falls in prevalence are rare – most countries have
experienced a continual rise in the overall use of controlled
drugs over the last 40 years, punctuated by occasional sharp
increases or declines for particular drugs or patterns of use.
These general trends seem to apply equally in countries that
have pursued tolerant or intolerant policies during this period.
In ‘western’ democratic societies, there is an almost total
absence of examples in recent history of an overall significant
and documented reduction in the prevalence of the use of
controlled drugs. There have been several reductions in the
level of use of a particular drug (for example, cocaine in the
USA in the 1990s and recent falls in ecstasy use in the UK), but
the only overall reduction we could identify was in the USA
during the 1980s. 
Two notes of caution are necessary on using this example. First,
even after the reductions in prevalence in this period, the USA
still had prevalence rates for youth drug use that were higher
than almost all other countries. Second, the decreases were
measured using general population surveys, which do not pick
up trends in the use of heroin and cocaine by marginalized
groups (the source of most drug related harm) – rates of use by
these groups seem to have remained stable during this period. 
However, the experience of the USA in the 1980s was real, and
did coincide with a period of strong anti-drug political activity
and rhetoric. It is puzzling, however, that these strong social
messages continued throughout the 1990s, when prevalence
rose again in the USA. Furthermore, the ‘deterence’ elements of
the US Government strategy – large scale arrests, widespread
drug testing, and harsh sanctions for users – were implemented
to a much greater degree in the 1990s, so no clear correlation
can be drawn between these government actions and the
reductions in prevalence. 
Researchers seem to agree, however, on one predictive factor for
reductions in prevalence – attitudes of young people. During
periods where surveys show that the proportion of young
people who see drugs as wrong or dangerous is rising, there
tends to be a fall in prevalence. This was true for overall use in
the USA in the 1980s, and for cocaine use in the 1990s, which
came down as overall use was rising. It seems logical that
prevention campaigns and political messages that emphasise
the badness and dangerousness of drugs will produce more
widespread anti-drug attitudes amongst young people, but
successive research studies have only found, at best, a marginal
impact. 
A stronger factor seems to be the cyclical nature of drug trends
– in the USA in the 1980s, the fashions and cultures associated
with cannabis use (which, as by far the most widely used illegal
drug, drives the overall prevalence figures) were in decline,
while the 1990s generation of young people had grown up with
ample evidence of the destructive impact of crack cocaine on
individuals and communities (for further discussion of these
and cognate issues, see MacCoun R and Reuter P 2001). 
RECENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES
The latest Monitoring the Future survey of high school students
in the United States shows what may be the early signs of
another period of falls in prevalence: an 11 per cent drop in
past-month use of illicit drugs between 2001 and 2003. This
survey shows a reduction in all of the most commonly used
substances, particularly marijuana and hallucinogens. Use of
ecstasy has been halved, and use of LSD has dropped by nearly
two-thirds (Monitoring the Future 2003). 
At the same time, the US National Drug Control Strategy 2004
expresses concern about a rise in the misuse of prescription
drugs. Over six million Americans told the National Survey on
Drug Use and Health 2002 that they had used prescription
drugs for non-medical purposes, and nearly 14 per cent of
young people said they had done so at some time in their lives.
Abuse of the prescription narcotic Vicodin among high school
seniors in the United States is now double the use of
methampetamine, cocaine or ecstasy. The National Drug
Control Strategy 2004 concludes that the use of this drug ‘has
become a deadly youth fad, with one out of every ten high-
school seniors reporting nonmedical use’ (White House 2004,
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they are in hiding, many risky behaviours happen … I think
they’re at greater risk of HIV, because it’s hard for individuals or
organisations to work with this group now, including for
research, education or access to health services … Some heroin
users switched drugs but continued to inject. Some started
using ya ba [methamphetamine] or other pills. Some just
turned to strong alcohol like Whiskey, which can cause
accidents. When you’re hiding from the police, it’s very difficult
to have drugs on you, so you need to use them in a hurry. This
can cause overdose’ (Human Rights Watch 2004, p. 37). 
The pursuit of a crackdown on the distribution and use of one
substance, with significant impacts on price and availability,
seems to have led to users moving to new substances and
drugtaking practices, some of which are more harmful than
those originally targetted.
The Iranian revolution 
The story of Iran’s Islamic revolution of 1979 provides an
interesting example of what appears to be a similar kind of
‘substitution effect’. An article on the impact of the Islamic
revolution on drug markets explains that, ‘control over the
growing of the opium poppy became ineffective at the time of
the revolution ... The initial increased availability of the drug,
combined with a dramatic curtailment of supplies of alcohol,
led to an escalation of drug abuse. The new regime made
alcohol a prime target. Newspapers of the time frequently
reported the seizure by police and revolutionary guards of
home distilleries and of large-scale equipment. As a
consequence, alcohol street prices increased to ten times the
pre-revolutionary level’ (Spencer C and Agahi C 1990-1991, p.
174). After successful law enforcement activity targeted at
alcohol production, prices rose and there was substitution of
opium for alcohol.1
PREVALENCE AND HARM
As these substitution effects show, the relationship between
prevalence reduction and harm reduction is not
straightforward.
The social costs of tough law enforcement
This point is well illustrated by developments in the United
States. There has been a significant fall in the use of drugs
among high school students, but levels of some forms of drug
related harm – particularly those relating to public health and
p. 24). Some 5 per cent of high school seniors also reported
nonmedical use of OxyContin - a powerful painkiller with ‘an
addiction potential similar to morphine’ (ibid).
It is surprising that the US National Drug Control Strategy does
not bring together the evidence for a steep rise in abuse of
prescription drugs and a fall in use of illicit drugs, and consider
whether these two phenomena are related in any way - the rise
in prescription drug abuse in the United States illustrates the
point that the overall impact of a fall in the use of a particular
drug or drugs will depend on trends in the use of other
substances – whether as direct substitutes or not.
SUBSTITUTION
The evidence suggests that if there is a shortage of one drug,
consumers may switch to other drugs. In Australia, for
example, the heroin drought led to a sharp rise in stimulant
use. Self-reported use of methamphetamine-type substances by
injecting drug users increased from 64 per cent to 76 per cent
between 2000 and 2001, and frequency of use from an average
of 15 to 30 days in the preceding six months (Bush W, Roberts
M and Trace M 2004, p. 2). Evidence from other domestic
campaigns shows a similar impact – drug users do not become
abstinent, but generally switch to another substance.
The Thai ‘war on drugs’
This ‘substitution effect’ appears to hold elsewhere. In February
2003, the Thai Government led by Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, launched a ‘war on drugs’ (for further discussion,
see Human Rights Watch 2004 & Roberts M, Trace M and
Klein A 2004). This was a response to an explosion of
methamphetamine use in Thailand. By the end of 2003 - with
over 2,000 alleged drug dealers killed in the course of the Thai
campaign - Prime Minister Thaksin declared that Thailand was
‘in a position to declare that drugs, which formerly had been a
big danger to our nation, can no longer hurt us’. This was a
gross exaggeration. But there is evidence for a fall in the
availability of methamphetamines, with the price of a single pill
reportedly rising from between $1.5 and $2.5 to between $6
and $8 (figures provided by Phongpaichit P 2003). 
However, the response of many drug users appears to have been
substitution, not abstinence. A first hand investigation on behalf
of the BFDPP reports that ‘the drug users who have low
income change to volatile substances (for example, lacquer and
thinner), as they are legal, cheap and convenient to buy from
the shop. For the drug users who have high income, they still
use the same kind of drug. Cocaine is new for Thai drug users.
Thais have started using cocaine widely in the last year’
(Roberts M, Trace M and Klein A 2004, p. 5). The Human
Rights Watch report quotes Mr Anurak Boontapruk, co-
ordinator of a drop in centre for drug users in Chiang Mai, who
comments on another substitution effect, amongst heroin users
driven into hiding: ‘some drug users have told us that when
1 From a Western perspective the substitution of opiates for alcohol may appear extreme,
but this reflects different cultural norms. For example, Spencer and Agahi explain that in
Iran ‘among drug experimenting adolescents, drug use did not seem to be associated with
social deprivation as drug users were not overrepresented among those from the most
deprived social background. Nor was it an expression of an adolescent counter-culture as
most young drug users had been introduced to the drug within family settings, rather than
as a result of encouragement from peers. Cigarette use, in contrast, was predicted more by
peer than family smoking patterns’ (Spencer C and Agahi C 1990-1991, p. 174). 
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social exclusion – are increasing. So what has been the overall
impact of US drug policy on drug-related harm? All else being
equal, less people using drugs will mean less drug related harm.
But other factors also need to be taken into account. The issue
of substitution has been discussed. Two further points should
be noted.
First, the impact of a reduction in the use and availability of
drugs on drug-related harms will depend on which drugs and
which patterns of use are targeted. A reduction in the number
of heroin addicts is likely to have a greater impact on drug-
related harms than an equivalent reduction in the numbers of
people experimenting with marijuana. Furthermore, while
experimentation with drugs is common among young people
from right across the social spectrum, the abuse of hard drugs
like crack cocaine and heroin is disproportionately a problem
for disadvantaged and marginalised communities.2 While
occasional and experimental drug use among the better off
appears to be falling in the US, many people from marginalised
and disadvantaged communities remain locked in a cycle of
drug addiction, offending, incarceration and re-offending. 
Second, there are negative externalities to a policy emphasis on
law enforcement. One of the most worrying phenomena has
been the impact of drug policy on the prison population in the
USA. In 1970, drug offenders constituted 16.3 per cent of the
federal prison population; by 2002 this had increased to 54.7
per cent. With an influx of drug offenders driving up the prison
population, the ‘correctional population’ – including every
person in jail on probation or on parole – reached 6,732,400 in
2002 (Bureau of Justice Statistics at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/).
The US imprisonment rate for drug offences is now higher
than that of most Western European nations for all crimes
(Macoun R and Reuter P 2001, p. 24).3 The rise of mass
incarceration has had a differential impact on different racial
and ethnic communities. In 1992, African-Americans
accounted for two thirds of people admitted to state prison for
drug offences. The lifetime chance of receiving a prison
sentence is 5.9 per cent for white males compared to 32 per
cent for black males (for further discussion see Curtis R and
Wendel T 2000 & MacCoun R and Reuter P 2001). 
More on costs
The histories of both the Australian heroin drought and the
Thai ‘war on drugs’ show that there can be a direct relationship
between a fall in the availability of a particular drug and other
harms – unless measures are in place to deal with the
consequences of a sudden fall in availability. 
For example, while indicators of health harms fell, there was a
sharp increase in robbery and ‘other thefts’ across Australia in
2001. The BFDPP Briefing Paper notes that the price of a gram
of heroin rose from around $40 to $300 in Australia between
1999 and 2001, and concludes that ‘a reasonable explanation
for some of the rise in property crime during this period is that
problem heroin users were adjusting their behaviour in
response to massive rises in street prices of heroin’ (Bush W,
Roberts M and Trace M 2004, p. 6). The Thai war on drugs
was also accompanied by a rise in low-level property crime. As
in the Australian case, this appears to be partly a result of small-
time drug dealers switching to other sources of illegal income
and/or drug users raising money to purchase
methamphetamines at increased prices. The Thai ‘war on
drugs’ had significant health costs as well. In particular, it drove
many injecting drug users into hiding and away from services
that could help to protect them from HIV/AIDs and other
drug related harms (Roberts M, Trace M and Klein A 2004). 
4. LIMITS ON DRUG POLICY
The most significant and sustained control of domestic drug
markets have been achieved in closed, authoritarian societies.
While these achievements will have kept drug related harm to a
minimum, the methods used would not be replicable or
acceptable in democratic societies.
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
‘Different from almost every single country in the world,
People’s Republic of China had experienced a thirty year period
(1949 to 1979) of no illegal drug using and dealing, thanks to
its effective and strict governmental control programme under
the socialist regime’. So begins an article on Chinese drug
policy by Wen Wang of California State University, published
in 1999 (Wen Wang 1999, p. 97). 
It is impossible to verify his claim that drug markets were
virtually non-existent in China for three decades. This seems
highly unlikely – if it is true, it is all the more remarkable given
estimates that at the end of the 19th century China had around
15 million opium addicts
(www.dpf.org/global/drugpolicy/asia/china). But there
certainly is evidence for a marked increase in drug use after the
1978 Chinese Economic Reform, and the liberalisation of
Chinese society. Wen Wang continues: ‘Since the 1978
Economic Reform, China has re-opened its door to the outside
world and the country’s economy has been affected not only by
foreign technology, but also by the international illegal drug
market … according to the Chinese Security Bureau, in 1990,
there were about 70,000 reported drug dealers in the
2 MacCoun and Reuter observe that ‘cocaine dependence is heavily concentrated in inner-
city minority communities’, adding that ‘a variety of imperfect data sources point to a
dramatic concentration of frequent cocaine use among African-Americans and Hispanics’
(MacCoun R and Reuter P 2001).
3 Nor is there evidence that mass incarceration is an effective policy for reducing drug and
drug-related crime. One study reports that of a total of 27,111 persons released from
prison in 15 states in 1994, 67.5 per cent had been re-arrested within three years.
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countryside and in cities. This number doubled in 1991,
tripled in 1992, and reached 520,000 in 1995. The rate of
increase was about 200 per cent’ (op cit, p. 98). 
An explosion in drug availability and use following a transition
from communism to market liberalism is not unique to China.
The spread of drug abuse in the former Soviet Union was
already underway before glasnost, but was rapidly accelerated by
the structural changes following the demise of communism (see
Klein A, Roberts M and Trace M 2004). 
Another example is provided in an article by Gustav
Kosztolanyi on developments in post-Communist Hungary.
Kosztolanyi explains: ‘as the grip of Communism progressively
relaxed, a new menace was added to our traditional Hungarian
vice of partiality to the demon drink with the increasing
availability of hard and soft drugs’ (Kosztolanyi G 2001). He
quotes Dr Andrea Pelle of the Executive Committee of the
Hungarian Civil Liberties Union: ‘Prior to the 1990s, drug
consumption was a sporadic phenomenon, more the
characteristic feature of belonging to a particular sub-culture
than anything else … From the beginning of the 1990s,
however, the situation began to change. The classical drugs
began to be available on the drugs market, and from the mid-
1990s onwards the number of people experimenting with
drugs, regular users, addicts and victims of drug abuse related
illnesses skyrocketed’ (ibid).
Some of the former communist regimes appear to have
succeeded in containing drug use and availability over extended
periods of time. This means that some of the best examples of
successful prevalence reduction may come from closed societies
in which drug offences have been punished in an excessively
harsh way, individual liberties curtailed, borders closed,
communications controlled by the state and human rights
violated.4 One of the dilemmas facing democratic societies with
market economies is the cost of drug enforcement policy in
terms of intervening in the market place and curtailing civil
liberties. These problems are less acute for authoritarian regimes.
The BFDPP has argued that drug policies should be constrained
by respect for human rights and judicial norms. 
THE LIMITS OF ZERO TOLERANCE
Drug policies that violate basic human rights can impact on
supply, but at an unacceptable cost. This certainly does not
mean that harsh policies are generally (let alone invariably)
effective, even if judged simply as a means of containing – or
reducing the scope of – drug production and drug markets. On
the contrary, a number of jurisdictions that have relied on harsh
punishment for drug offenders in the past are beginning to
recognise their limitations.
Iran provides a good example. The Ayatollah Khomeini
government responded to the increase in opium use in post-
revolutionary Iran with a national campaign against drug abuse
launched in 1979. The early months of 1980 witnessed the
extensive use of the death penalty for drug traffickers.
Punishments for drug offences have remained harsh in Iran,
including lashings and death penalty sentences (although the
latter is now reserved for the most serious drug offences). Yet,
according to the UNODC, 90 per cent of all morphine and
opium seizures occur in Iran and the past 10 years have seen a
year-on-year increase in the number of drug seizures. Iran has
responded – against the background of an HIV/AIDS and
Hepitis epidemic – with a more progressive approach with a
greater focus on public health (see
//cira.med.yale.edu/research/irandrug.html).5
It is a similar story in former communist countries. In China,
the Government responded to the explosion in drug use after
economic liberalisation with a zero tolerance approach. In
2002, more than 60 people were executed for drug offences,
and possession cases receive ‘no less than 7 years
imprisonment’. But China’s drug problems have continued to
increase, and it is now starting to recognise the need for harm
reduction initiatives. The Drug Policy Alliance reports that
‘illicit drug users are now referred to as “illegal patients” rather
than “illegal persons” and according to Chinese law drug users
must be rehabilitated. Most recently, China has established a
methadone programme for heroin users in an attempt to
reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis through
injecting drug use’
(www.dpf.org/global/drugpolicyby/asia/china). 
The law was also tightened in post-communist Hungary in
1999. Illegal drug consumption is now punished by up to two
years imprisonment, regardless of the type of drug. Dr Andrea
Pelle of the Executive Committee of the Hungarian Civil
4 An article by Y L Yao of the Chinese Ministry of the Interior, published in the 1950s,
explains that ‘recidivist’ narcotic addicts ‘are liable to imprisonment for from three to seven
years for first offence; to imprisonment for a term equivalent to one and two-thirds of the
original sentence for the second offence, and to the death penalty for the third offence’
(Yao Y L, p. 6). These were the penalties for drug use. 
5 In the mid-1990s, the Iranian Government introduced a law that exempted drug users
who sought treatment from punishment. There have been similar developments in other
Islamic states. Saudi Arabia implements strict Islamic sharia law. It has been reported that
35 convicted drug traffickers were publicly beheaded in 2000. However, things may be
changing. An article published in the New York Times in 2002, comments that ‘the
government says the harsh punishment and the kingdom’s relative isolation from drug
sources make drug addiction less severe than in countries like Iran and Pakistan’. But it
continues: ‘it is a serious enough problem that the rulers have begun … to deal with it …
openly. And while the Government treats drug trafficking as a criminal activity it has
begun to regard drug, alcohol and nicotine dependency as treatable illnesses’ (‘In Saudi
Arabia, addicts are treated but dealers are executed’, San Jose Mercury News, 11 February
2002).
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Liberties Union comments: ‘In my opinion, the tightening up
of the law from March 1999 onwards is no good to anyone: it
has not led to a drop in the number of people taking drugs and
the threat of prison does nothing to dissuade youngsters from
trying out drugs’(Kosztolanyi G 2001). Another former
communist country, Russia, has recently moved in the opposite
direction to China and Hungary. In 2004, after a short-lived
attempt to control the explosion of drug use through harsh
penalties, it effectively decriminalised the offence of possession
of drugs for personal use – defined as no more that 10 times the
amount of a “single dose” – which is now dealt with by
administrative fines or community service
(www.dpf.org/global/drugpolicyby/asia/russia). 
THE BIGGER PICTURE
The re-introduction of tough laws in Hungary, Russia and
China did not result in a corresponding fall in drug use, and
put severe pressure on each country’s criminal justice system.
Trends in drug use and the behaviour of drug markets depend
on a whole range of economic, social and cultural factors. The
rapid increase in illicit drug use in former communist countries
following market liberalisation was not simply the result of the
removal of oppressive enforcement mechanisms. Borders
became more porous, young people tended to adopt fashions
drawn from liberal market societies, and the transition to a
market economy was accompanied by economic and social
problems that have been linked to drug abuse. Drug prevalence
within a particular society at a particular time is not simply, or
necessarily at all, a product of its drug policies. 
An exception may be evident in the analysis of the Swedish
experience. Sweden is explicitly committed to the creation of a
drug free society, and to the belief that substantial falls in the
use and availability of drugs can be socially engineered. It has
been vocal in its opposition to ‘harm reduction’, and it claims
that the comparatively low levels of drug use in Sweden are the
result of ‘tough’ drug laws. 
Since the late 1960s, penalties for drug offences have increased
and drug use has been penalised (with urine and blood tests for
people suspected of using drugs). An EMCDDA publication
from June 2002 comments that ‘all forms of illegal handling of
narcotic drugs are criminalised in Sweden. It would be hard to
find something that could add to the substantial criminal law.’ It
continues: ‘Swedish criminal policy is, in general, relatively
restrained as far as the use of imprisonment is concerned. This
is, however, absolutely not true in relation to narcotic drug
offences’ (EMCDDA 2002). For these offences, imprisonment
is a ‘frequent’ penalty. At the same time, drug use is
comparatively low. A comparative European survey of 15 year
old school children established a cannabis prevalence level of 8
per cent in Sweden, compared to 35 per cent in the United
Kingdom, and a European average of 16 per cent (Hibell B et al
1999). In 2000, around 13 per cent of the Swedish population
aged 15-64 reported a lifetime experience with any illegal drug.
Lifetime prevalence rates for cocaine, heroin and ecstasy were all
below 1 per cent (National Report Sweden 2002, EMCDDA).
Is Sweden an example of what can be achieved by an
uncompromising supply side approach? It is once again
difficult to disentangle the impact of law enforcement from
other elements of drug policy – including Swedish prevention
and information initiatives and commitment to ensuring that
every drug abuser can access treatment. But what distinguishes
Sweden’s position from neighbouring countries with similar
socio-economic conditions is the long term creation of a strong
anti-drug social consensus. There are grounds for concern
about recent developments in the epidemiology of drug use in
Sweden, with evidence of increased availability in Swedish drug
markets, lower prices and a greater variety of drugs. As with the
United States, there are particular concerns about problem
drug use. It is estimated that the numbers of ‘advanced drug
abusers’ almost doubled between 1979 and 1998, from 15,000
to 26,000. During 2000 around half of the nearly 10,000
people in prison were drug users, and three quarters of this
group were severe drug users (ibid). 
It is also necessary to consider wider contextual factors in
evaluating the Swedish situation. There has been a particularly
strong anti-drug culture in Sweden. For example, a recent
survey of 16 to 24 year olds concluded that over 90 per cent of
young people were opposed to the decriminalisation of
cannabis (in most European countries, opinion is more evenly
divided). It is hard to believe that this culture is itself the
product of a tough law enforcement driven approach – so that
it would be replicable in other countries that adopted similar
drug policies to Sweden – but it has undoubtedly been
important for sustaining and supporting those policies. Second,
there is compelling evidence from around the world of a link
between problem drug use and a range of social problems. Per
capita income is substantially higher in Sweden than the
European average (115.4 compared to 100), there is less
inequality of income (3.4 compared to 4.4) and the
unemployment rate is significantly lower (4.9 compared to 8.9)
(Data from Country Situation Summaries on the EMCDDA
website at www.emcdda.eu.int). 
CONCLUSION
The BFDPP has been unable to identify many well-
documented examples of successful supply reduction. Those we
have identified have tended to be comparatively short-lived and
to have occurred in special circumstances. Nor is it easy to
demonstrate a clear link between particular law enforcement
actions and specific outcomes – not least, as there is a striking
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shortage of detailed discussion of these (or other relevant) case
studies in the literature. 
The BFDPP has not been able to conduct a sophisticated
analysis for this report. But a number of key points have
emerged from our investigation, and should be noted in
conclusion.
Interrogating the evidence. There is a shortage of well-
documented examples of supply reduction. The BFDPP is
committed to an evidence-based approach to drug policy. We
believe that there is a growing body of evidence regarding what
policies and activities are (and are not)effective in reducing
drug use and drug-related harms, but that this evidence is not
being sufficiently taken into account in the current policy
debate. It is difficult not to view with suspicion the claims
made by over a quarter of a total of 92 countries reporting to
the UNODC that they have decreased drug abuse in their
jurisdiction. If these claims are well-substantiated, then it
would be of enormous benefit for policy development
elsewhere in the world to be able to assess independently the
basis for these successes. It is regrettable that the identity of
these countries are not in the public domain.
Disaggregating the drug problem. The impact of a fall in
drug abuse on drug-related harms will depend on which drugs
are being used less frequently and which groups of users are
adjusting and adapting their behaviour. All else being equal, it
is reasonable to assume that a fall in the problematic use of hard
drugs will have a greater impact on drug-related harm than an
equivalent fall in the experimental use of drugs like marijuana.
The contrast between the drug strategies of the United States
and the United Kingdom is interesting in this respect. The
White House’s 2004 National Drug Control Strategy defends its
focus on drug use among high school students – rather than the
urban poor – by claiming that ‘marijuana smokers account for
the lion’s share of Americans who are dependent on illegal
drugs – more than four million of a total of seven million
individuals whose use of illegal drugs of all types is serious
enough to be labeled as abuse or dependence’ (White House
2004, p. 41). This claim would appear to rest on a controversial
definition of dependence. By contrast, the United Kingdom’s
Updated Drug Strategy 2002 has a clear focus on ‘the most
dangerous drugs, the most damaged communities and the
individuals whose addiction and chaotic lifestyles are most
harmful, both to themselves and others’ (Home Office 2002). 
The problems of analysis. The relationship between policies,
initiatives and actions and the behaviour of drug markets is far
from straightforward. The Australian heroin drought shows
that successful law enforcement action can contribute to a
reduction in supply – at least in the short-term – by influencing
the marketing decisions of drug traffickers. But the impact of
one big Australian heroin seizure on the subsequent decisions
of traffickers was mediated by a range of other factors – notably,
a sharp fall in production of heroin. Similarly, the United States
has experienced a fall in drug abuse among young people, but
the precise causal explanation for this reduction is unclear. In
particular, the claim by the United States’ Government that this
success vindicates a massive investment in drug testing in
schools is highly controversial. An American correspondent
told the BFDPP, ‘I’ve never seen a rigorous statistical analysis
that established a causal relationship between anything the
government does and prevalence rates … on the face of it, such
claims would be very hard to make’ (private correspondence).
There is also evidence that the scope of drug markets was
rigidly contained within some former communist countries.
But – leaving aside human rights and cognate issues – this
probably had as much to do with the impenetrability of their
borders (geographical and cultural) as with their internal drug
policies as such. Certainly, a reversion to harsh drug laws after
the transition to market liberalism does not appear to have had
the desired impact on drug supply. Again, a more detailed
historical analysis is needed to disentangle cause and effect. 
Supply and demand. The evidence shows that successful
supply reduction will tend to be short-lived unless effective
action is also taken to address the demand-side (for example,
through drug treatment or effective prevention programmes).
This is a matter of basic economic laws. If levels of demand are
constant, a reduction in the supply of a drug will drive up the
street price and make it more profitable for drug traffickers.
This economic logic seems to have been borne out –
empirically – by recent developments in Thailand and
Australia. Another form of market adaption that occurred in
both these countries was the substitution of drugs that were
harder to get hold of in local drug markets (methamphetamine
and heroin respectively) by other drugs. If people with serious
dependency problems are not being treated, they are unlikely to
give up using psycho-active substances simply because they are
unable to get hold of their ‘drug of choice’. A similar point
applies to initiatives to reduce the production of drugs in
countries like Myanmar, Laos and Afghanistan – so long as
demand for opiates is buoyant, successful initiatives to cut
opium cultivation in one area will always lead to an increase in
production elsewhere. 
Supply reduction and drug-related harm. The BFDPP has
consistently argued that the ultimate objective of drug policy
should be an overall reduction in drug-related harm. The first
BFDPP report argued for a shift in the evaluative emphasis from
effectiveness in reducing the use and production of drugs to
effectiveness in reducing the harm associated with drug use and
drug policy – while also recognising that reducing prevalence is
itself an effective way of reducing harm (Roberts M, Klein A and
Trace M 2004). The evidence considered for this third BFDPP
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report shows that the costs of successful supply reduction
initiatives can be high. A good example of this is the trend to
mass incarceration and ethnic division that has been a feature of
the enforcement of drug policy in the United States. (It should
be said, however, that there is no reason to assume – as
commentators sometimes do – that the aspects of United States’
drug policy that have helped to reduce drug use among young
people cannot be separated out from those elements that have
helped to fuel the exponential rise in the prison population.) A
reduction in the supply of drugs can also produce a rise in forms
of drug-related harms in a direct way, unless demand and harm
reduction initiatives are also in place. The case studies
considered for this Beckley Report show – for example – that a
fall in the availability of particular drugs can be linked to a rise
in low level property crime and an increase in risky behaviours
among drug users (such as unsafe injecting practices).
In the few examples where supply side interventions have been
evaluated the focus is essentially on demonstrating impact on
prevalence. Little attention is given to the balance sheet of
harms. Enforcement interventions are inevitably instusive
particularly when applied to producer countries and there can
be considerable collateral damage not only in terms of human
rights but in terms of local and national economies, the
environment, the functioning of democratic institutions,
health and social exclusion. The net outcome of supply side
interventions should be assessed not only on prevalence and
containment levels but on whether the anticipated harm from
illegal drugs supply would have been significantly higher than
the harm resulting from intervention itself. By contrast,
prevention and treatment prevention programmes often have a
range of incidental benefits in terms of social inclusion which
are routinely acknowledged in evaluations.
Draconian drug policy. It appears that some of the most
successful attempts to control the production, supply and abuse
of drugs have occurred in closed societies and/or as a result of
campaigns against drug users and low level dealers that have
shown scant regard for human rights or wider humanitarian
considerations. The BFDPP has argued that effectiveness in
prevalence reduction should not be the measure of policy
success, for at least two reasons. First, it is necessary to take into
account the costs of these policies. Second, drug policy should
be conducted within clear deontological constraints. The
pursuit of harm minimisation objectives should ‘respect
universal human rights, and subject to this requirement, local
judicial norms and practices’. It is salutary to note that some of
the more successful recent policies to control and contain the
supply of drugs have failed to respect these basic principles.
Critics of the status quo often conclude that a lack of evidence
that law enforcement can bring about sustainable reductions in
drug supply provides a conclusive indictment of current
approaches to drug policy. Certainly, it reveals some serious
challenges for this paradigm. But this is oversimplistic. While
the successes of law enforcement in reducing the supply of drugs
may be few and far between, it is probable that prevalence
would be greater still in the absence of initiatives targeting the
supply side of drug markets. This issue of containment is
crucial to drug policy – two questions need much closer
research examination:
• to what extent do existing policies and supply reduction
initiatives prevent an even higher level of use and harm?
• would this potential increase in use and harm be realized if a
more tolerant approach was taken by governments? 
There are clearly widely divergent opinions on these questions,
but to date very little credible modeling has been undertaken. 
Our review of supply reduction policy does raise serious
questions about the current trends and trajectories of
international drug policy – and the high proportion of drug
budgets that continue to be devoted to law enforcement at the
expense of demand-side initiatives and harm reduction policies. 
NOTE TWO FINAL POINTS:
First, there is little ground for optimism that a substantial
curtailment in the scope of drug markets (national or
international) is a credible objective – at least, short of a
recourse to draconian policies. On the contrary, the evidence
suggests that prevalence will continue to increase in most
countries. While containing – and, ideally, reducing – growth
in the use and availability of drugs is an important means of
minimising drug-related harms, it is likely to have only a
limited impact. It is important, therefore, to develop harm
minimisation policies that are adapted to the reality of the
widespread use of drugs in many parts of the world for the
foreseeable future. The persistence of such widespread drug use
also means that the uncompromising enforcement of existing
drug laws will tend to draw large numbers of people
(particularly young people) into the orbit of the criminal justice
system. 
Second, even where there has been a successful reduction in
aspects of a drug market through supply reduction
interventions, the impact on actual harms has not been
universally positive. At the production end of the chain,
reductions in cultivation of heroin or cocaine are normally
associated with extreme hardship for the farmers and
agricultural workers who have traditionally relied on income
from this trade. At the consumption end of the chain, the
experience from across the world – in Australia, Thailand and
the USA – is that drug users respond to restrictions on the
availability of their drug of choice by switching to other
substances, or engaging in an ever more desperate search for
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their preferred drug. These changes of behaviour may lead to a
reduction in drug related health or social problems, but are
more often associated with higher social dislocation and risk-
taking behaviour. The mix of social, cultural and psychological
factors that lead individuals into drug use in the first place is
not fundamentally altered by the success or failure of supply
reduction measures. Supply-side policy may be one tool of drug
policy, but it is not a satisfactory drug policy in its own right.
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